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I'm Mark van Roojen, a professor of philosophy at the University of Nebraska - Lincoln. This page has drafts of some of my unpublished papers for you to download if you like.
Here is a copy of my Conditionals Paper from RoMe I Conference. I gave this paper at the Rocky Mountain Ethics Conference in Boulder in August 2008. I now think that the issue is not really about conditionals, but instead about practical reasoning. So the thesis should really be that if you are going to use conditionals to talk about practical rationality, you should use conditionals which allow detachment. (Note that that description of the point is itself an instance of the phenomenon under discussion.) I don't know whether more will come of this paper or not, but I will leave it here in the meantime.
I've also finished a new draft of a paper I presented at the Second Rocky Mountain Ethics Conference (a.k.a. RoME II) in August of 2009. This paper is an exploration of what intuitionist moral epistemologists can say to answer empirical challenges to their views about justified moral beliefs. Extant moral intuitionsts all seem to be "moderate foundationalists" and these attacks seem to show that many putative foundational beliefs are not formed by processes that are reliable enough to consititute justification sufficient to believe them. My basic idea is to propose that they drop back to a weak foundationalist view of justification similar to that once championed by Bertrand Russell. The paper is currently titled "Moral Intuitionism, Experiments and Skeptical Arguments" and if you click the title you'll get a pdf of that paper. This is now the penultimate draft, soon to be published in a volume entitled "Intuitions", edited by Anthony Booth & Darrell Rowbottom, under contract with OUP.
Normative Ethics and Political Philosophy
I gave a paper on what is known as the "circularity objection" to Scanlon's account of promising at the Third Annual Arizona Workshop in Normative Ethics early in January 2012. Mark Timmons has been putting together this conference for a few years now and it is a real delight to give a paper there. The paper benefited enormously from the comments I got at the conference. The conference version of the paper is password protected at the Arizona site, but you can find a copy of the penultimate draft (which will be published in the 3rd volume of Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics, edited by Mark Timmons, at here. I argue that the objection really comes to a wrong kind of reasons for belief objection and then try to overcome it without recourse to social practices.
A New Argument for the Maximin Principle draft of July 2007.I gave a version of this paper in Bled in Summer 2008 and that version is now out in Acta Analytica. You can find that version at Springer's website at: http://www.springerlink.com/content/e5n153g878777708/fulltext.pdf. The version here is different enough that I'm leaving it up and it is free.
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